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Abstract: Business disruption from cyberattacks is a growing concern, yet cyberinsurance uptake 
remains low. Using an online behavioural economics experiment with 4800 participants across four 
EU countries, this study tests a predictive model of cyberinsurance adoption, incorporating ele-
ments of Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) as well 
as factors in relation to risk propensity and price. During the experiment, participants were given 
the opportunity to purchase different cybersecurity measures and cyberinsurance products before 
performing an online task. Participants likelihood of suffering a cyberattack was dependent upon 
their adoption of cybersecurity measures and their behaviour during the online task. The conse-
quences of any attack were dependent upon the participants insurance decisions. Structural equa-
tion modelling was applied and the model was further developed to include elements of the wider 
security ecosystem. The final model shows that all TPB factors, and response efficacy from the PMT, 
positively predicted adoption of premium cyberinsurance. Interestingly, adoption of cybersecurity 
measures was associated with safer behaviour online, contrary to concerns of “moral hazard”. The 
findings highlight the need to consider the larger cybersecurity ecosystem when designing inter-
ventions to increase adoption of cyberinsurance and/or promote more secure online behaviour. 
Keywords: cybersecurity; cyberinsurance; protection motivation theory; theory of planned 
behaviour 
1. Introduction
Cyberinsurance (sometimes also referred to as cyber risk or cyber liability insurance) 
is a form of insurance cover designed to protect an individual or business from digital 
threats (e.g., cyberattacks, hacking and data breaches). Cyberthreats can refer to inten-
tional, malicious attacks or accidental breaches. Widespread cyberinsurance adoption has 
a number of potential benefits in a society facing increasing cybersecurity risk. Firstly, it 
could lead to market-based management of that risk by acting as a mechanism for spread-
ing the risk amongst multiple stakeholders. Secondly, since obtaining insurance requires 
that certain cybersecurity standards are met, it could act as an incentive towards organi-
sational investments in information security, which would reduce risk for the investing 
organisation and for their wider network. Here we are referring to additional protective 
behaviours that an individual or organisation can do to protect against cyber-risk (e.g., 
obtaining anti-virus software, installing regular security updates, using a firewall). In this 
sense, cyberinsurance and other security measures are complimentary goods. Thirdly, in-
surance investigators follow up on serious incidents to learn what went wrong, therefore 
uptake could also lead to data aggregation on best practices and better tools for assessing 
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security—something that is currently lacking. In principle, a robust cyberinsurance offer 
could strengthen IT security for society as a whole [1,2]. However, despite the growing 
risk of cyberattack, uptake of cyberinsurance as a mechanism to ameliorate risk (financial 
and otherwise) has not reached expectations, with some research reporting uptake rates 
as low as 10% in the UK [3]. 
There are also concerns around adverse selection and moral hazard in relation to in-
surance uptake. Adverse selection can occur if high risk individuals are more likely to 
adopt insurance policies than their lower risk counterparts. Adverse selection is possible 
when information asymmetries mean that the insurers are not fully aware of the risk level 
of the individual applying for an insurance policy, resulting in a premium that does not 
adequately reflect the insureds risk level [4]. In contrast, moral hazard refers to individu-
als increasing their exposure to risk (e.g., acting less cautiously) following adoption of 
insurance—due to feeling that they no longer personally bear the full costs of the risk as 
insurance coverage is in place [5]. More research is needed to identify whether these con-
cerns are justified. 
1.1. Theoretical Models 
Recently, a number of studies have used traditional psychological models that define 
the relationships between attitudes, intentions and behaviours, to understand more about 
insurance uptake and/or information security protocol (ISP) compliance. There are three 
key theoretical models often applied in this field: the theory of planned behaviour (TPB), 
protection motivation theory (PMT) and general deterrence theory (GDT) [6,7]. The tech-
nology acceptance model (TAM) is also applied, but arguably not as often as the afore-
mentioned [7]. 
In the context of ISP, TPB suggests that intention to comply with ISPs depends on the 
individual’s overall evaluation of, and normative beliefs toward, compliant behaviour—
including the degree to which they feel their compliance is within their control.  
PMT suggests that an individual’s attitude toward ISPs is shaped by the evaluation 
of two cognitive appraisals: threat appraisal and coping appraisal. Threat appraisal is de-
pendent upon both the perceived severity of, and vulnerability to, a threatening event 
(e.g., security breach). Coping appraisal reflects the perceived efficacy of the recom-
mended protective behaviour (i.e., ISP compliance) and the individual’s perceived self-
efficacy to implement this behaviour.  
GDT states that individuals make rational decisions based upon weighing up the 
perceived severity of sanctions and perceived certainty of sanctions. 
TAM states that an individual’s intention to comply with ISP is predicted by the per-
ceived usefulness and perceived ease-of-use of information security measures. 
Within this field, published reviews consistently show the TPB is the most widely 
applied of the four models [6,7]. Described by Nasir et al. [7] as “the most dominant the-
ory” with “the most significant main constructs in predicting and explaining employees’ 
ISP compliance behavior” (p. 740). However, although TPB is the most prolific model in 
the field, that is not to say that its predictive ability cannot be improved. To further in-
crease the explained variance, models are often combined. For example, Ifinedo’s [8] 
widely cited study demonstrates that the inclusion of PMT constructs to the TPB model 
can increase explained variance in ISP compliance from 0.60 to 0.70. Ifinedo [8] suggests 
that “the fusion of both theoretical frameworks permits a better understanding of the sorts 
of factors that affect employees’ ISP behavioural compliance as opposed to when each is 
used alone to investigate the theme” (p. 90). Similarly, Sommestad et al. [9] asked whether 
the TPB and/or PMT are sufficient to account for cybersecurity policy compliance in em-
ployees. They concluded that both models do a “fairly good job at prediction intentions 
and behaviour” (pp. 14–15), but also noted that the regression model of the TPB could be 
improved by the addition of threat appraisal constructs from PMT.  
PMT covers similar factors to the two of the other more popular models: GDT and 
TAM. For example, threat appraisal can also include the threat of sanctions (as per GDT), 
Sustainability 2021, 13, 9528 3 of 16 
 
and coping appraisal includes both the perceived efficacy of the protective behaviour and 
self-efficacy (which has similarities to the TAM constructs of perceived usefulness and 
ease-of-use). For this reason, and to keep within the scope of this research, TPB and PMT 
were chosen as the two models to be applied. We describe these two models below, out-
lining their putative relationship to cyberinsurance uptake and then go on to a more care-
ful critique of the predictive power of their constituting factors. We use this information 
to develop a hypothetical research model for cyberinsurance adoption. 
1.1.1. Protection Motivation Theory 
PMT was originally designed to explain engagement in protective actions in relation 
to health-related behaviours (Figure 1) [7]. However, as noted earlier, the theory has since 
been applied to the explanation of other protective actions, including uptake of insurance 
[10–13] and the adoption of secure online behaviours [14,15]. PMT proposes that people 
protect themselves by making both a threat appraisal and a coping appraisal. The threat 
appraisal is dependent upon both the perceived severity of a threatening event (in this 
instance a cyberattack) and the perceived vulnerability to the event (i.e., the perceived 
probability of that event occurring). The coping appraisal reflects the perceived efficacy 
of the recommended protective behaviour (cyberinsurance in this case) and the individ-
ual’s perceived self-efficacy (e.g., their ability to successfully implement the requirements 
for a cyberinsurance policy). To explain: an individual considering whether to invest in 
cyberinsurance may firstly weigh up the likelihood that they will receive a cyberattack of 
a particular severity against (a) the cost of taking out cyberinsurance (finances, time, ef-
fort) and (b) how effective they believe that insurance will be (response efficacy) and/or 
how much confidence they have in their own ability to put insurance measures into place 
(self-efficacy). 
 
Figure 1. Protection motivation theory. 
1.1.2. Theory of Planned Behaviour 
TPB highlights additional factors which may influence insurance purchase decisions. 
TPB states that intention to perform a behaviour is the most immediate and important 
determinator of behaviour (although perceived control has also been shown to influence 
behaviour directly, as represented by the dashed line in Figure 2) [16,17]. Intention is in-
fluenced by the individual’s attitude(s) towards the behaviour, subjective norm(s) and 
perceived control over the situation. Brahmana et al. [18] applied the TPB to explore in-
tention to purchase health insurance. The TPB suggests that strengthening positive atti-
tudes towards cyberinsurance (e.g., strengthening the belief that insurance companies 
would pay out in the event of a cyber-incident) could increase cyberinsurance uptake. 
Likewise strengthening perceived subjective norms around cyberinsurance may help to 
increase uptake (e.g., strengthening the perception that others believe cyberinsurance to 
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be a worthwhile product). Perceived self-efficacy from PMT and perceived behavioural 
control from TPB are thought to measure the same construct [8]. 
 
Figure 2. Theory of planned behaviour. 
1.2. Our Research Model 
Although widely used, these models are not without criticism. A systematic review 
by ENISA [19] found that the coping elements of PMT and the TPB were useful (p. 11), 
but questioned the predictive value of threat models, including PMT’s threat appraisal. 
This is curious when we consider that Sommestad et al. [9] found added predictive value 
in the threat component, and concluded that no single PMT variable was able to explain 
more than a small portion of the variance within the studied populations. This in line with 
the underlying idea of PMT, which describes how six variables together determine inten-
tions through cognitive processes. Sommestad et al. suggested that inconsistencies in how 
constructs are measured could lead to the discrepancy between studies (p. 15). We should 
also bear in mind that for the aforementioned systematic review by ENISA, the search 
terms included cybersecurity items but did not include “security” or “information secu-
rity policy”, therefore missing some of the studies cited above. That said, other recent 
work has also suggested that coping elements offer greater value than threat elements 
when trying to predict or improve online security behaviour [14].  
Based on the existing literature, we feel confident in the hypothesis that the coping 
appraisal factors should be influential, but we are less certain about the predictive power 
of the threat appraisal components. In drawing up our hypothetical research model for 
the adoption of cyberinsurance (Figure 3), we have included all of the PMT factors (threat 
appraisal: perceived severity, perceived vulnerability; coping appraisal: response efficacy, 
self-efficacy, response costs) and TPB factors (attitudes and subjective norms) but have 
noted where the hypothesised links are weaker, indicating these by dashed lines in the 
model.  
There are three other elements in our research model: risk propensity, insurance pric-
ing strategy, and attack intentionality. We provide the rationales for including each of 
these elements below: 
Firstly, we include risk propensity (sometimes referred to as risk preference or risk 
tolerance). Previous insurance research has shown that risk adverse individuals are more 
likely to purchase flood insurance [11,13], health insurance and life insurance [20,21]. This 
makes sense since insurance represents a means of risk mitigation. In our study we meas-
ure risk propensity using the seven item risk propensity scale [22] with the hypothesis 
that individuals who are more risk adverse would be more likely to purchase insurance, 
whereas individuals who are more willing to take risks may be less inclined to adoption 
of premium insurance.  
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Figure 3. The research model. Strong hypothesised links are shown as solid lines. Weaker or less supported hypothesised 
links are shown as dashed lines. 
Secondly, we include a factor that takes the insurance pricing strategy into account. 
Cyberinsurance is likely to adopt a heterogeneous pricing model, in part because the 
measures companies take to mitigate threats will vary. Under such circumstances, con-
sumer perceptions about what price is reasonable and fair will vary, but are likely to in-
fluence willingness to adopt both protective measures (e.g., antivirus software, firewalls) 
and a premium insurance product [23]. Insurers will also want to reduce systemic risk 
(also known as correlated or aggregate risk) across their portfolio to avoid catastrophic 
losses that may arise from the interdependencies of networked organisations. Khalili et 
al. [24] have suggested that this can be partly achieved by setting the price to incentivised 
purchase of premium insurance products that themselves may be contingent upon the 
company’s security posture. In terms of our own research model, we manipulated price 
to be either dependent or independent of the security measures in place (i.e., in the de-
pendent category price of the insurance policy varied dependent upon the cybersecurity 
measures the individual had opted for). This is referred to as the insurance pricing strat-
egy in Figure 3. This allowed an empirical assessment of the extent to which making in-
surance premiums contingent upon a company’s security posture would improve or limit 
cyberinsurance uptake.  
Thirdly, we added one further factor, Attack intentionality, relating to the context of 
a cyberattack, i.e., whether an attack is targeted or random [25], something explicitly rec-
ommended in the ENISA review [19]. This factor relates to a literature on cyber-risk com-
munication [26] which shows that users are more likely to be persuaded by messages 
which describe their particular vulnerability to an attack, but also relates to a literature on 
the efficacy of targeted risk communication in order to nudge cybersecurity behaviour 
[27]. Our hypothesis is that risk framed in terms of an intentional, targeted attack will be 
more likely to result in the adoption of premium cyberinsurance. 
1.3. The Value of Behavioural Data 
The majority of existing studies into cybersecurity behaviours have relied upon self-
reported measures rather than measuring actual behaviour [19]. Unfortunately, self-re-
porting does not always correlate with actual behaviour [28] and this has become some-
thing of a thorny problem for large-scale survey studies of ISP [6]. To address this, we 
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applied a behavioural economics experiment approach. This novel approach provides a 
scientific method to study how individuals interact within a controlled setting and enables 
the collection of behavioural data. In doing so, we also help to address some of the con-
cerns identified by Botzen and van den Bergh [29] who noted that “measuring risk atti-
tudes and risk perception at the individual level and estimating their influence on insur-
ance demand, […] is rarely possible in actual insurance decisions and has hardly been 
addressed in empirical work” (p. 152). With this in mind, our study analyses direct be-
havioural data, in combination with relevant attitude scales, to test our predicted model 
of cyberinsurance adoption. Mol, Botzen, and Blasch [30] applied a similar approach to 
investigate factors underlying uptake of insurance by home-owners in flood-risk areas. 
However, to the best of our knowledge this is the first study to apply an experimental, 
behavioural economics approach to understand decision-making in relation to cyber-
insurance. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Sample and Recruitment 
Participants (N = 4800) were recruited across four EU countries (Germany, Spain, 
Poland and UK) in June 2018 using an online panel. Participants were contacted online 
and invited to participate in the experiment. After informed consent, they were provided 
with a link to access the experimental software. 
Participants ranged from 16–74 years of age (Table 1). Distribution by age and gender 
reflects Eurostat’s data from the 2017 survey on ICT (Data given in this domain are col-
lected annually by the National Statistical Institutes and are based on Eurostat's annual 
model questionnaires on ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) usage in 
households and by individuals. https://ec.europa.eu/euro-
stat/cache/metadata/en/isoc_i_esms.htm, Accessed on 10 May 2018) that was used to cre-
ate the quota (a sample design that has been applied in previous research [14,31]). Most 
participants (91.6%) were educated to high school level or above. We present the data 
using two age division categories (16–34 years and 35–74 years), Greater age categorisa-
tion would not be appropriate for the sample size and as we do not present analysis per 
country—any differences in age distribution per country is not expected to affect the ex-
perimental results. 
Table 1. Distribution of the participants by gender, age and country. 
  
Germany 
(n = 1200) 
Spain 
(n = 1200) 
Poland 
(n = 1200) 
UK 
(n = 1200) 
    n  %  n  %  n  %  n  %  
Gender  Male  617  51.42  600  50.00  552  46.00  595  49.58 
  Female  583  48.58  600  50.00  648  54.00  605  50.42 
Age  16–34 y  932  77.67  842  70.17  713  59.42  844  70.33 
  35–74 y  268  22.33  358  29.83  487  40.58  356  29.67 
2.2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
An online behavioural economic experiment (BEE) was designed and implemented 
to measure participants’ cybersecurity decisions in a controlled situation. The experi-
mental design, including the form to ask for informed consent for participation, the ex-
perimental tasks and interventions and data management and analysis, was presented to 
the Ethical Committee of CYBECO, which considered that the proposed research proto-
cols fully comply with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki (1989), Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (UNESCO, 1948) and the Agreement for the Human Rights Pro-
tection in Biology and Biomedicine (Oviedo, 1997) and approved them. The experiment is 
mainly composed of two tasks:  
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(i) Purchase decisions about cyberinsurance and security measures products (cyberse-
curity strategy);  
(ii) Online behaviour whilst performing an online task. 
The instructions clearly explained all tasks and decisions to be made during the ex-
periment and their implications. Figure 4 shows the experiment blueprint. 
 
Figure 4. Experimental blueprint (SM = security measures). 
Specifically, at the start of the experiment, each participant was provided with an 
initial endowment of 650 virtual coins (VC). They were informed that they could exchange 
VCs for Euros at the end of the experiment. Each participant was then informed that they 
were at risk of a possible cyberattack, which if suffered would have a detrimental impact 
on the value of their commercial data and therefore lower the variable payment they 
would receive at the end of the experiment. Depending on the experimental condition, 
participants were informed whether the possible cyberattack was random (i.e., randomly 
selecting targeted individuals/companies on the internet) or intentional (i.e., a hacker 
launching attacks targeting companies like theirs). After being provided with this infor-
mation, participants were asked to visit an online “shop”(see Figure 5), where they were 
asked to make two decisions: 1. Whether to opt for basic or advanced security measures, 
and 2. Whether to opt for no insurance, basic insurance or premium insurance. 
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Figure 5. Mock-up online shop. 
Note that the online shop presented participants with explicit information about the 
way that purchases would either reduce the likelihood of an attack (when buying security 
measures) or provide financial recompense in the event of an attack (in the case of cyber-
insurance). The exact information shown to participants in shown in Figure 5, and sum-
marised in Table 2. Depending on the condition to which they were allocated, the price of 
the insurance policy may or may not be dependent on the security measures chosen (i.e., 
in the dependent condition, the price of the insurance policy would decrease as level of 
security measures increases, with the cheapest price for individuals who opted for ad-
vanced security measures. In the independent condition, the price of the insurance did 
not alter regardless of the security measures chosen).  
Table 2. Experimental purchase decisions and impact on attack probability and financial coverage (VC = virtual coins). 
Factor/Decision Levels Price (VC, Deducted from Endowment) Impact 
Security Measures Basic 0 Attack probability = 40% 
 Advanced 314 Attack probability = 20% 
Insurance None 0 Financial amount insured = 0 VC 
 Basic 140 Financial amount insured = 350 VC 
 Premium 280 Financial amount insured = 700 VC 
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After making their purchases in the online shop, participants were then asked to 
complete an online task which involved registering for a conference. During the task, their 
possibility of suffering a cybersecurity attack was increased or decreased depending upon 
the security of their online behaviour. The security of their online behaviour was calcu-
lated using four behavioural measures obtained whilst participants were completing the 
online task: i. The strength of their chosen password, ii. Whether they logged out after the 
task, iii. Whether they read the website terms and conditions before registering, and iv. 
whether they disclosed any non-compulsory private information during the transaction. 
The final score was calculated as a continuous variable (The risk level is computed from 
the following binary variables, which are equal to 1 if they verify the following statements 
or 0 otherwise: Password,   
    
: Password does not contain capital letters; Password does 
not contain lowercase letters; Password does not contain numbers; Password does not 
contain special characters (['^£$%&*()}{@#~?><>,|=_+¬-]); Password is short (less than 8 
characters); Password includes the username (case-insensitive). Registration,   
   
: The 
participant has filled the “First name” field; The participant has filled the “Last name” 
field; The participant has filled the “Occupation” field; The participant has filled the 
“Phone Number” field; The participant has filled the “Address” field; The participant has 
filled the “City” field; The participant has filled the “Zip” field. Privacy policy,   
  
: The 
participant has not opened the “Privacy Policy” window. Log out,   
   
: The participant 
has not logged out of the website after the registration. The security level,   , is obtained 











     . Where    represents the weight of each binary variable, given by 
, ,     = 0.15 and      = 0.15.) between 0 (safest behaviour) 
and 1 (riskiest behaviour). 
Following their completion of the conference registration task, participants were then 
informed whether they had, or had not, suffered a cyberattack and informed of their final 
payout. As detailed above, the final payment was influenced by the participants cyberse-
curity and cyberinsurance decisions, and whether they did, or did not, suffer a cyberattack 
(with the probability of the latter influenced by their security purchases and their online 
behaviour). 
Following completion of the economic experiment, participants were presented with 
an online questionnaire measuring factors relating to the two psychological models (PMT 
& TPB). 
2.3. Experimental Conditions 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of 12 experimental conditions. The con-
ditions are based on two experimental manipulations: Attack intentionality and Insurance 
pricing strategy.  
Attack intentionality had two levels: Intentional attack (participants are informed 
that an attacker may specifically target their company) and random attack (participants 
are informed that there is a virus in the Internet that may randomly affect any user). 
Insurance pricing strategy had six levels obtained from the combination of three dif-
ferent prices (low, medium, high) and two different relationships between the prices of 
the security measures and insurance policies (dependent price—i.e., the price of the insur-
ance policy decreases if advanced cybersecurity measures are chosen, and independent 
price, i.e., the price of the insurance policy remains the same regardless of whether the 
participant opted for none, basic or advanced security measures).  
2.4. Psychological Measures 
Following completion of the experiment, participants were presented with an online 
questionnaire measuring factors relating to PMT: perceived severity, perceived vulnera-
bility, response efficacy, response cost and self-efficacy. In addition to the PMT items, two 
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other measures were included to fit with the TPB: attitudes towards insurance and sub-
jective norms. The measure for attitudes towards insurance was based upon Anderson 
and Agarwal’s [32] measure of attitudes toward security-related behaviour, amended to 
apply specifically to insurance. While subjective norms were measured using the single 
item “People who are important to me think that I should have insurance”. All PMT and 
TPB items were scored on a 5-point scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).  
The final two measures related to risk propensity (an individual’s natural tendency 
to take risks) and intention to purchase insurance. Risk propensity was measured using 
the risk propensity scale (RPS) [22]. This 7-item scale has been used to measure risk pro-
pensity in relation to online behaviour [33] and requires considerably less space than the 
other commonly used, but lengthy, domain-specific risk-taking scale [34]. The specific 
items used are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Instrument items. 
Construct  Items  
Perceived Severity  If my online data/accounts were hacked, it would be severe   
Perceived Vulnera-
bility  
a. My online data/accounts are at risk of being compromised  
b. It is likely that my online data/accounts will be breached  
c. It is possible that my online data/accounts will be compromised  
Response Efficacy  
a. Insurance is an effective method to protect against loss  




a. I feel comfortable taking measures to secure my own computer(s)  
b. I feel comfortable taking security measures to limit the threat to other people and the Inter-
net in general  
c. Taking the necessary security measures is entirely under my control  
d. I have the resources and the knowledge to take the necessary security measures  
e. Taking the necessary security measures is easy   
Response Cost & 
Rewards  
a. Insurance is financially costly for me  
b. Setting up insurance would require too much from me 
c. Insurance is burdensome for me  
d. Insurance is time consuming for me  
e. Insurance is not worth it  
f. Claiming on insurance could harm a business/organisations reputation  
Attitudes  
a. Insurance is a good idea  
b. Insurance is important  
c. I like the idea of taking out insurance to protect me   
Subjective Norms  People who are important to me think that I should have insurance   
Risk propensity  
a. Safety first 
b. I do not take risks with my health  
c. I prefer to avoid risks  
d. I take risks regularly   
e. I really dislike knowing what is going to happen   
f. I usually view risks as a challenge  
g. I view myself as a… [risk avoider vs. risk seeker]   
Intention  I am likely to purchase cyber insurance  
2.5. Analysis 
Preliminary analysis was carried out to confirm that the data was suitable for struc-
tural equation modelling (SEM). Correlation coefficients were used to examine relation-
ships between all the variables. The structural model was tested using R (packages psych, 
semTools and lavaan). SEM is a method that combines and estimates two procedures sim-
ultaneously: confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and path analysis. CFA assesses the meas-
urement component of the model, and path analysis assesses the relationship between 
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latent variables [35]. SEM allows us to include numerous endogenous variables and also 
to control for systematic and random measurement error [36].  
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Behavioural Measures 
The majority (83.4%) of participants opted for a high level of protection by purchas-
ing the advanced security measures, and 93% decided to purchase cyberinsurance. The 
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics. 
 Levels n % 
Security Measures Basic 797 16.6 
 Advanced 4003 83.4 
Insurance None 336 7.0 
 Basic 2054 42.8 
 Premium 2410 50.2 
As only 7% of participants did not opt for any cyberinsurance, we collapsed the ‘no 
insurance and basic insurance’ categories and focused upon modelling the adoption of 
premium insurance in subsequent analyses. 
3.2. Measurement Model Analysis 
Using exploratory factor analysis, a test of reliability was conducted for each con-
struct. During this analysis, items for attitudes and subjective norms loaded on the same 
factor and therefore were combined in the subsequent analyses. Some items of response 
cost (Table 3: Items a, e, f) and risk propensity (item e) were eliminated to improve con-
struct reliability.  
Means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alpha scores for the remaining con-
structs are shown in Table 5. All Cronbach’s alpha scores are greater than 0.7 indicating 
good reliability [37,38]. 
Table 5. Construct means, variances, and Cronbach’s alpha (α) scores. 
  M  SD  α 
Perceived vulnerability  3.5  0.95  0.86  
Response efficacy  3.5  1.00  0.74  
Perceived behavioural control  3.7  0.78  0.84  
Response cost  3.0  0.85  0.83  
Attitudes & Subjective norms  3.8  0.84  0.87  
Risk propensity  3.5  1.30  0.74  
3.3. Structural Equation Modelling 
The SEM model for premium cyberinsurance adoption is shown in Figure 6. Solid 
lines represent significant pathways (p < 0.05). There are four significant pathways influ-
encing premium insurance adoption: Perceived response efficacy and the TPB pathway 
(social norms and attitudes, via intention) both positively influence premium insurance 
adoption. Whilst, risk propensity and insurance pricing strategy negatively influence pre-
mium insurance adoption. Attack intentionality does not appear to have any significant 
effect upon adoption. 
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Figure 6. SEM model of cyberinsurance adoption (standardised coefficients). 
Adoption of premium insurance also shows a positive relationship with secure 
online behaviour. However, it is important to note that the decision to purchase cyber-
insurance does not usually occur in isolation—it is likely to coincide with the decision to 
purchase additional security measures (e.g., antivirus, firewalls). This is further reinforced 
by the likelihood that insurance companies will require a minimum level of security be-
fore insurance will be granted. Therefore, a second model was created which includes the 
purchase of security measures—shown in Figure 7. 
The second model shows a significant positive pathway that links the adoption of 
advanced security measures to the adoption of premium insurance. Thus, individuals 
who adopted advanced security measures were more likely to also adopt premium insur-
ance. This is the strongest pathway in the model. The adoption of advanced security 
measures was also significantly positively related to security of online behaviour; those 
who adopted advanced security measures were also more likely to behave securely 
online. The pathway between insurance adoption and online behaviour, although posi-
tive, failed to reach significance once adoption of security measures was introduced into 
the model. 
Response efficacy (part of PMT coping appraisal) and the TPB factors (attitudes and 
norms) were positively related to adoption of premium insurance, i.e., those who per-
ceived insurance to be more effective, and those who had positive attitudes and positive 
subjective norms, were more likely to adopt premium cyberinsurance. Perceived self-effi-
cacy and perceived threat severity (part of PMT threat appraisal) both positively fed into 
the adoption of advanced security measures rather than adoption of premium insurance 
directly. Those who had higher perceptions of their ability to put cybersecurity measures 
into place, and those who perceived the threat of the cyberattack as more severe, were 
more likely to adopt advanced security measures (which as aforementioned then subse-
quently fed into premium insurance adoption).  
Sustainability 2021, 13, 9528 13 of 16 
 
 
Figure 7. SEM model including security measure adoption (standardised coefficients). 
Risk propensity was negatively related to both adoption of security measures and 
adoption of insurance, i.e., a risk-seeking individual was less likely to adopt advanced 
security measures and premium insurance. 
As found in the first model, attack intentionality (i.e., targeted vs. random) had no 
significant effect upon insurance adoption, nor upon purchase of security measures. 
4. Discussion 
The current study used SEM to test a model of cyberinsurance adoption and address 
a significant gap in the existing literature. Despite a fast-growing interest in, and industry 
around, cybersecurity—there is an overwhelming lack of knowledge in relation to under-
standing the mechanisms behind cybersecurity decision-making. The results support the 
model as a good fit to the data therefore providing important knowledge of the factors 
influencing cybersecurity decisions—including uptake of security measures and insur-
ance.  
Our findings highlight that cyberinsurance adoption is only one factor in a larger, 
more complex security ecosystem. The decision to adopt premium cyberinsurance was 
directly influenced by the adoption of other advanced security measures i.e., those who 
invested in advanced security measures were more likely to also purchase premium in-
surance. Interestingly, adoption of advanced security measures was also predictive of 
more secure online behaviour. Suggesting that concerns over moral hazard (i.e., that an 
individual may increase their exposure to risk if they do not bear the full costs of that risk) 
may be unfounded. On a related note, our results suggest that risk-seeking individuals 
are less likely to adopt advanced security measures and premium cyberinsurance—which 
suggests that concerns over adverse selection may also be unfounded. 
The adoption of advanced security measures was positively influenced by perceived 
severity of an attack and perceived self-efficacy (i.e., confidence in one’s own ability to 
implement security measures). Again, risk propensity was negatively related to adoption, 
with risk-seeking individuals being less likely to adopt security measures.  
Taken together, the findings suggest that, in order to adequately target insurance up-
take, it is important to account for the wider portfolio of security measures available to an 
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individual or organisation. It is also vital that future research accounts for this interde-
pendency between insurance and security measures. This conclusion is entirely consistent 
with the ENISA [19] recommendations for organisational contexts to be more carefully 
considered.  
Outside of security measure adoption, uptake of premium insurance was negatively 
influenced by risk propensity and insurance pricing strategy, and positively influenced 
by response efficacy, and positive attitudes and social norms. These results are relatively 
unsurprising: individuals with a higher propensity for risk were less likely to adopt pre-
mium insurance, and an insurance pricing strategy based on higher premium policy pric-
ing (comparative to basic insurance) led to lower premium insurance uptake. In keeping 
with PMT, those who perceived insurance to be an effective method to protect against loss 
were more likely to adopt premium insurance; and in line with TPB, positive attitudes 
towards insurance (e.g., perceiving insurance as a good thing) and strong social norms 
(i.e., perceptions that other people think they should have cyberinsurance) were linked 
with intention to adopt premium insurance.  
Interestingly, perceived vulnerability (one element of PMT threat appraisal) was not 
a significant predictor of advanced security measures or premium insurance adoption. 
Attack intentionality, also thought to relate to perceptions of vulnerability, was also non-
significant. These are troubling findings for the appropriateness of PMT for explaining 
cyber-risk, and beg the question as to why perceived severity of an attack (the other ele-
ment making up PMT threat appraisal) may be influential, but perceived vulnerability 
less so. To a certain extent, this adds to the existing debate, described earlier, around the 
limited value of the “threat assessment” component in predicting cybersecurity behav-
iours. PMT, like so many behaviour-change models, was largely developed as a means of 
understanding health behaviours, where the health threats are experienced at a personal 
level and where vulnerability can clearly be understood in personal terms. For cybersecu-
rity, this connection is sometimes broken and whilst participants might be able to under-
stand the severity of an attack in general terms, their own vulnerability to an attack can 
remain uncertain. It is also possible that threat factors may be sensitive to demographic 
differences such as age, gender or country, that are outside of the scope of this study, but 
that could be explored in future work. 
The weak influence of perceived vulnerability may also be exacerbated in an experi-
mental study such as this. Behavioural economics experiments have a good track record 
of capturing real world, policy-relevant behaviours [39] and the use of incentives, as in 
the current study, is also a well-validated method used to help enhance the ecological 
validity of the experiment [39,40]. However, vulnerability judgements require an assess-
ment of the likelihood that a particular organisation will succumb to a threat, but in our 
experimental set up, little is offered in the way of organisational context to help make this 
assessment. True, we sought to manipulate context by describing the threat as either tar-
geted or not, but we provided no background information as to the resilience of the or-
ganisation at the start of the study. Simply put, how could our participants determine 
vulnerability? This is worth considering in future studies and indeed such experimental 
effects may help to account for the ENISA report [19] observation that threat information 
tends to be relatively ineffective in driving behaviour. That said, this study still helps to 
address the relative lack of experimental approaches to cybersecurity behaviour; of which 
there are even fewer that combine subjective and objective measures (despite some evi-
dence that hybrid approaches may provide a useful new source of evidence around cy-
bersecurity and cyberinsurance behaviours [14,41]). 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we identified the key factors underlying decision-making around cy-
bersecurity. The model presented here, which combines factors from PMT and TPB, could 
be used to guide future interventions aimed at increasing cyberinsurance (and cybersecu-
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rity) uptake. Our findings show that it is vital to consider the larger cybersecurity ecosys-
tem, rather than attempting to focus upon insurance adoption in isolation (as insurance 
uptake appears to be directly influenced by adoption of other security measures). This 
focus upon the wider ecosystem could help to improve societal cybersecurity, although 
we note that context rich studies of cybersecurity remain limited. Positively, our findings 
suggest that individuals who invest in cybersecurity may tend to be more risk adverse, 
which may help to abate insurers concerns around moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Our study also adds to existing debates around the usefulness of the threat appraisal 
elements of the PMT model (e.g., [14,19]), by suggesting that the coping appraisal ele-
ments may be more influential when applying the model in this space. 
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